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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
THOMAS PARRISH, : Case No. 930770-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Rule 
26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), whereby the defendant in a Circuit 
Court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final order for anything other than a first degree or 
capital felony. In this case, Appellant was found guilty of 
Battery, a class B misdemeanor, and sentenced in a bench trial by 
the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, Judge of the Third Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake City Department, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue before this Court and standard of review is as 
follows: 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible 
error in Appellant's trial for Battery by 
allowing evidence of his prior conviction of 
Disorderly Conduct? 
The admission of evidence is a question of law and is reviewed 
for correctness, however, the trial court's subsidiary factual 
determinations, if any, are given deference by the Appellate Court 
and will be overruled only when clearly erroneous. State v. 
O'Neal, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. 
Diaz, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
When reviewing a trial court's balancing of the probativeness 
of the piece of evidence against it's potential for unfair 
prejudice under Rule 403, the appellate court will only reverse if 
the trial court's decision as a matter of law was unreasonable. 
O'Neal, at 16. 
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TEXT OF PERTINENT RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion/ or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 provides: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except; 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, 
or by the prosecution to rebut the same. 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the 
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution 
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait 
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence 
that the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the 
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 
608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 608 provides: 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The 
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to 
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence 
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of truthful character is admissible only after the character 
of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion 
or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific 
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other 
than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not 
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in 
the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness 
or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination 
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another 
witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by 
any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the 
accused's or the witness' privilege against self-
incrimination when examined with respect to matters which 
relate only to credibility. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive 
to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness 
either by examination of the witness or by evidence 
otherwise adduced. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from judgment and conviction for Battery, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 
11.08.020. Mr. Parrish was found guilty in bench trial on October 
29, 1993. Mr. Parrish was sentenced on October 29, 1993 to 180 
days in jail. The court suspended 150 days and placed Mr. Parrish 
on good behavior probation for a period of one year. On 
November 30, 1993, Mr. Parrish filed a Notice of Appeal. Due to 
excusable neglect on the part of Mr. Parrish's counsel, a Motion, 
Stipulation, Order to Extend the Time for Filing the Notice of 
Appeal, and a second Notice of Appeal was filed on December 29, 
1993. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The substance of the allegation against Mr. Parrish was 
that he kicked his wife in the back as she lay on their bed. 
During the course of the bench trial, Mr. Parrish commented on 
direct examination that this was not the first time his wife had 
called the police, nor was it the first time he had been arrested. 
(Transcript "T" 19) . On cross examination the city prosecutor 
elicited an admission from Mr. Parrish that this was the third time 
in as many months that his wife had called the police. (T. 20) . 
Since it was clear that the city prosecutor intended the 
trial court to infer from this question that Mr. Parrish had beaten 
his wife in the past, defense counsel on re-direct asked 
Mr. Parrish if at any time he had ever beaten his wife. 
Mr. Parrish denied that he had at any time beaten his wife. (T. 
21) . On re-cross examination, the city prosecutor confronted 
Mr. Parrish with a prior conviction for Disorderly Conduct, an 
infraction, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.12.020, 
from a few days ago. Not content with merely bringing up the prior 
conviction, the city prosecutor questioned Mr. Parrish as to his 
specific conduct in the case. 
Specifically, the prosecutor tried to characterize the 
Disorderly Conduct conviction as involving a finding that 
Mr. Parrish had threatened his wife or engaged in some sort of 
threatening behavior toward his wife. (T. 21). Mr. Parrish then 
admitted that he was found guilty of disturbing the peace and not 
threatening his wife. Again the prosecutor questioned him further 
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as to his conduct on that occasion attempting to elicit an 
admission that Mr. Parrish had engaged in fighting, threatening, 
and tumultuous behavior. (T. 21) . When Mr. Parrish denied the 
allegations, the city prosecutor confronted him with the fact that 
she had prosecuted that case as well, inferring that she knew the 
facts to be otherwise. 
At this point, Mr. Parrish's counsel objected to the 
prosecutor's reference to the prior case on the grounds that it was 
intended to be character evidence and was, therefore, inadmissible, 
and even if it were admissible, under Rule 4 03, the probative value 
was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect. (T. 22). 
The city argued that Mr. Parrish had opened the door to this line 
of questioning by testifying that he expected to be arrested, that 
he had been arrested three times before, and that he had never 
beaten his wife. The city further argued that because Mr. Parrish 
had denied threatening his wife, evidence of his prior conviction 
for Disorderly Conduct could be used to impeach his credibility. 
(T. 22). 
The trial court overruled Mr. Parrish's objection, 
reasoning that Mr. Parrish did open the door and, therefore, the 
prior conviction was a legitimate area of cross-examination. In 
addition, the court found that the prejudice involved did not 
outweigh the probative value of the evidence. (T. 23). 
Commenting that this case ultimately came down to 
deciding the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court found 
Mr. Parrish guilty of Battery, a class B misdemeanor. (T. 27) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court committed reversible error by admitting 
evidence of Mr. Parrish's prior conviction for Disorderly Conduct. 
Evidence of his prior conviction is not admissible under Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence or Rule 608(b) of the Rules of 
Evidence. It is clear that the city introduced Mr. Parrish's prior 
conviction intending to show that he had a violent temper and that 
on this occasion he acted in conformity with his violent character. 
Additionally, the trial court erred in ruling that 
Mr. Parrish opened the door to cross examination of his prior 
conviction of Disorderly Conduct. Mr. Parrish denied beating or 
threatening his wife in the past. He admitted that he was guilty 
of disturbing the peace. Evidence of the prior conviction for 
Disorderly Conduct cannot be characterized as rebuttal evidence as 
it did not directly contradict his statements. Disorderly Conduct 
covers a wide range of behavior which includes disturbing the peace 
and need not necessarily involve violent or threatening behavior. 
Furthermore, even if Mr. Parrish's prior conviction was 
admissible under Rule 404(b) or Rule 608(b), Rule 403 of the Rules 
of Evidence bars its introduction because the prejudicial effect of 
such evidence substantially outweighs it's probative value. 
Evidence of Mr. Parrish's prior conviction has very little 
probative value. The mere fact that Mr. Parrish had been convicted 
of Disorderly Conduct a few days prior is immaterial to the 
question of whether he was guilty of Battery in an unrelated 
incident. Evidence of his prior conviction was not probative to 
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his credibility as it is not a crime of dishonesty and did not 
contradict Mr. Parrish7s assertion that he had never beaten his 
wife in the past. 
Lastly, the introduction of Mr. Parrish7s prior 
conviction for Disorderly Conduct was reversible error as there is 
a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. Aside from the complainant's testimony, the city had 
no independent evidence to support it7s case. The city's entire 
case hinged upon the credibility of the complainant's testimony, 
and discrediting Mr. Parrish7s testimony. While it is reasonable 
to expect a judge in a bench trial to exercise greater discipline 
of mind than a jury, it is unreasonable to assume that evidence 
that Mr. Parrish had been involved in altercations with his wife in 
the past did not affect the trial judge's assessment of his 
credibility. For this reason, the likelihood of a different 
outcome to the trial is sufficiently high to undermine confidence 
in the verdict. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. MR. PARRISH'S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT IS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER 
RULE 404(b). 
The trial court erred in admitting Mr. Parrish's prior 
conviction for Disorderly Conduct. Rule 404(b) provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake, or accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
It is clear that the city sought to introduce Mr. 
Parrish's prior conviction for Disorderly Conduct in an attempt to 
show that he had a propensity to commit violent acts towards his 
wife. Proof that Mr. Parrish had been involved in some type of 
altercation with his wife on a prior occasion could serve no other 
conceivable purpose. These were two entirely unrelated incidents. 
The fact that Mr. Parrish might have been guilty of Disorderly 
Conduct in the past is not probative as to whether he was guilty of 
committing Battery against his wife on a later date. Mr. Parrish's 
prior disputes with his wife are not probative to his intent on 
this occasion. State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 427-28 (Utah 
1989). 
In sum, no legitimate reason existed to introduce 
evidence of Mr. Parrish's prior conviction of Disorderly Conduct. 
Rule 404(b) limits the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes 
due to the tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused because 
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of his bad character rather than because he is shown to be guilty 
of the offense charged. "Because of this tendency, such evidence is 
presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the admission of the 
evidence other than to show criminal disposition the evidence is 
excluded". State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). 
II. MR. PARRISH DID NOT "OPEN THE DOOR" TO 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTION FOR 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT UNDER RULE 608(b). 
Mr. Parrish's denial that he had ever beaten or 
threatened his wife did not open the door to introduction of his 
prior conviction for Disorderly Conduct pursuant to Rule 608(b). 
Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness 
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the 
witnesses' credibility other than conviction 
of crime as provided in Rule 609 may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the Court, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, 
be inquired into on cross examination of the 
witness (1) concerning the witnesses character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness or (2) 
concerning the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which 
character the witness being cross examined has 
testified. 
Utah R. Evid. 608(b). 
It is a well settled rule that when a defendant chooses 
to testify in his own defense he is subject to being impeached. 
Impeachment may include cross examination which would tend to 
contradict his credibility. Such evidence may be introduced to 
impeach the defendant's credibility even if it is also evidence of 
a prior bad act that would not otherwise be admissible. State v. 
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Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 626 
P.2d 483, 485-86 (Utah 1981); State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 812 
(Utah 1979). However, Mr. Parrish's prior conviction for 
Disorderly Conduct does not contradict his assertion that he has 
never beaten or threatened his wife and for that reason is not 
admissible to impeach his testimony under Rule 608(b). Disorderly 
Conduct, under the Salt Lake City Code, is an offense against 
public order not an offense against persons. Pursuant to Salt Lake 
City ordinance 11.12.020, a person is guilty of Disorderly Conduct 
if he: 
1. Refuses to comply with the lawful order of 
the police to move from a public place, or 
knowingly creates a hazardous or physically 
offensive condition by any act which serves no 
legitimate purpose; or 
2. Intending to cause inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a 
risk thereof: 
a. engages in fighting or in 
violent, tumultuous, or threatening 
behavior; or 
b. makes unreasonable noises in a 
private place which can be heard in 
a public place, or maliciously or 
wilfully disturbs the peace or quiet 
of another or of any neighborhood or 
family by loud or unusual noise or 
by discharging firearms of any 
description, or by threatening, 
traducing, quarreling, challenging 
to fight, or fighting, or by use of 
profane or blasphemous language; or 
c. obstructs vehicular or pedestrian 
traffic; or 
3. Uses insulting, obscene, or profane 
language in a place or under circumstances 
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which could cause a breach of the peace of 
good order of the city. 
It is clear that Disorderly Conduct covers a very wide 
range of behavior. When confronted with his prior conviction for 
this offense, Mr. Parrish admitted to disturbing the peace. It was 
improper for the city prosecutor to attempt to use this prior 
conviction to impeach Mr. Parrish's assertion that he had never 
beaten or threatened his wife. The prosecutor cannot pick and 
choose among the many types of conduct covered under this ordinance 
in an attempt to circumvent Rule 404(b) and introduce otherwise 
inadmissible evidence. It is not at all clear that Mr. Parrish's 
conviction for Disorderly Conduct involved any kind of behavior 
which contradicts his assertion that he had never beaten or 
threatened his wife. No evidence was submitted by the city to 
indicate whether Mr. Parrish's conviction for Disorderly Conduct 
was based on threatening behavior or simply a loud and quarrelsome 
family fight. 
This case is, therefore, distinguishable from the above-
cited cases. In Reed, Lopez, and Wells, prior bad act evidence was 
admitted which directly conflicted with the defendant's assertions. 
For example, in Reed, the defendant testified that he did not use 
drugs. A police officer's testimony of discovery of drug 
paraphernalia in the defendant's house was thus admissible 
impeachment evidence. In Lopez, the defendant denied on direct 
having kicked someone in the head in a fight which was related to 
the current case at trial. Therefore, testimony of a state's 
rebuttal witness that the defendant had kicked another person in 
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the head during that incident was proper. And, again, in Wells, 
the Court held that evidence directly contradicting the defendant's 
assertion that he had never pointed a weapon at the victim before 
was proper. 
Unlike all of these cases, Mr. Parrish's prior conviction 
for Disorderly Conduct was not proper rebuttal evidence as it did 
not contradict his testimony on direct. The trial court erred by 
allowing the city to introduce inadmissible character evidence 
under the guise of impeachment evidence. 
III. EVEN IF MR. PARRISH'S PRIOR CONVICTION 
FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT WERE ADMISSIBLE UNDER 
RULES 404(b) OR 608(b), THE EVIDENCE SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED BECAUSE THE PROBATIVE VALUE 
IS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY THE DANGER OF 
UNFAIR PREJUDICE. 
The trial court erred in refusing to 
Mr. Parrish's conviction for Disorderly Conduct pursuant 
403. Rule 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. 
This Court has considered several factors when balancing 
the probativeness of evidence against its prejudicial effect. 
These factors include: 
The strength of the evidence as to the 
commission of the other crime, the 




of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
O'Neal, 848 P.2d at 701. 
In this case, both the prior conviction and the current 
charge involved the same complainant and were similar in that both 
incidents arose out of domestic disputes. Because of these 
similarities the risk was unjustifiably high that the fact finder 
would unfairly characterize Mr. Parrish as someone who routinely 
terrorized his wife. Such hostility toward Mr. Parrish unfairly 
undermined his testimony. The prejudice against Mr. Parrish is 
exacerbated by the fact that the only defense he could offer was 
his word against that of his wife's. Lastly, evidence of Mr. 
Parrish's prior conviction was not crucial to the city's case. 
Evidence of the prior incident shed no light on the events which 
led to the later charge of Battery. 
In sum, the trial court unreasonably concluded that the 
probative value of the conviction was not outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice and, thus, erred in admitting the evidence. 
IV. THE ADMISSION OF MR. PARRISH'S PRIOR 
CONVICTION FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT WAS NOT 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
The trial court's admission of Mr. Parrish's prior 
conviction for Disorderly Conduct was not harmless error. Harmless 
errors are "errors which, although properly preserved below and 
presented on appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that . . . 
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there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings". State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 
(Utah 1992) . An error requires reversal when the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high to undermine confidence in 
the verdict. Jd. In making this determination the Court should 
consider a number of factors including "the importance of the 
witness' testimony to the prosecution's case and the overall 
strength of the state's case." Id. 
Here, the city's evidence consisted solely of the 
complainant's allegation. There were no independent witnesses nor 
was there any physical evidence. Clearly, evidence that 
Mr. Parrish had allegedly been involved in a prior domestic dispute 
with his wife was devastating. Since Mrs. Parrish's testimony was 
the only evidence before the court, evidence of the prior incident 
was so prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the verdict. 
While it is safe to assume that a "trial court will be 
somewhat more discriminating in appraising both the competency and 
the effect properly to be given evidence," it is unreasonable to 
assume that the admission was harmless error simply because the 
case was tried to the bench and not to a jury. Featherson, 781 
P. 2d at 431. This case hinged on a determination of the 
credibility of the two witnesses involved. One can safely assume 
that the trial court, in theory, understood the limited purpose of 
the introduction of Mr. Parrish's prior conviction. However, it is 
quite another matter to reasonably expect the court to successfully 
execute the mental gymnastics required to reach that result. As 
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disciplined as the trial court's thinking may have been, it is 
expecting too much of any human being in a case as close as this 
one to completely ignore allegations that Mr. Parrish had 
previously threatened or abused his wife. In the absence of any 
other evidence, admission of Mr. Parrish's prior conviction for 
Disorderly Conduct constituted prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument the defendant, 
Mr. Parrish, respectfully moves this Court to reverse his 
conviction for Battery, a class B misdemeanor, and remand this case 
for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S day of April, 1994 
/ 
^L ^6 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
TEXT OF PERTINENT RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 provides: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except; 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, 
or by the prosecution to rebut the same. 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the 
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution 
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait 
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence 
that the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the 
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 
608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 608 provides: 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The 
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to 
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence 
of truthful character is admissible only after the character 
of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion 
or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific 
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other 
than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not 
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in 
the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness 
or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination 
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another 
witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by 
any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the 
accused's or the witness' privilege against self-
incrimination when examined with respect to matters which 
relate only to credibility. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive 
to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness 
either by examination of the witness or by evidence 
otherwise adduced. 
